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INTRODUCTION 
Price controls are unpopular, except when they are imposed on plain-
tiffs’ lawyers.  Sixteen states have caps on contingency fees;1 none cap de-
fense-side fees.2  The federal government limits the fees plaintiffs can pay 
in Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) cases,3 Social Security disability cas-
es,4 and claims for veterans’ benefits.5  In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the House 
of Representatives passed a bill capping contingency fees in medical mal-
practice cases—only to see it die in the Senate each time.6  Judges have fol-
lowed suit; in recent aggregate products liability proceedings, three federal 
judges capped the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees after noting a “trend in the states 
to limit contingent fees to 33-1/3% or less of net recovery.”7 
Claimants are the supposed beneficiaries of these restrictions, which are 
said to protect them from excessive legal fees.8  The assertion is facially 
plausible: lawyers’ fees are the biggest component of litigation costs, so 
policies that reduce fees may help claimants.  Yet, the pressure to cap con-
tingent fees comes from tort reform groups, representing drug manufactur-
ers, medical providers, liability insurers, and other repeat players on the de-
fense side in litigation.  Like all interest groups, tort reform groups 
advocate policies that help their supporters.9  Because tort reform groups 
have defendants’ interests at heart, it is safe to assume that these groups 
 
 1. See generally David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Charles Silver & William Sage, Es-
timating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 355 (2009) [hereinafter Damage Caps]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2678 (West 2006) (FTCA cap of 20-25%). 
 4. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 406 (West 2006) (Social Security cap of 25%). 
 5. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. 566, 568. 
 6. See Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (“HEALTH”) Act of 
2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. § 5 (2004). 
 7. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see 
also In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 617 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Gui-
dant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at 
*17 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008).  For an analysis of judicial practices regarding fees in MDLs, 
see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Mul-
ti-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352646. 
 8. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 360 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (observing that fee caps were originally implemented “to protect the 
veteran from extortion or improvident bargains with unscrupulous lawyers”). 
 9. These policies include such reforms as caps on compensatory and punitive damages, 
abolition of the collateral source rule, heightened standards of pleading and proof, mandato-
ry non-binding alternative dispute resolution, and limits on advertising by attorneys.  The 
object of these policies is to reduce claim values by lowering recoveries and making litiga-
tion more expensive. 
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expect caps on contingency fees to help defendants—most likely because 
price controls tend to cause the supply and quality of services to decline.10  
When lawsuits become less profitable for lawyers, plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
predictably become more selective and may even move into other un-
capped lines of work, or retire.  Because expected marginal earnings also 
decline, lawyers will predictably invest less in the cases they do accept—
that is, they will litigate less intensively. 
Will plaintiffs’ ability to recover for their injuries also decline?  Al-
though most academics believe “meaningful access” to the tort system re-
quires legal counsel,11 claimants can always represent themselves.12 Many 
tort claims settle without formal litigation, and nearly all settle without tri-
als.13  Some studies contend that claimants who represent themselves don’t 
do that much worse than claimants represented by attorneys once attorneys’ 
fees are subtracted.14  If self-representation is a viable option, caps on con-
 
 10. See generally ROBERT L. SCHUETTINGER & EAMONN F. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES 
OF WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS (1979). 
 11. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice in the Age of Tort 
Reform: Survival of the Fittest—It’s Even More True Now, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 285, 287 
(2006/2007) [hereinafter Survival of the Fittest]; see also HERBERT JACOB, LAW AND POLI-
TICS IN THE UNITED STATES 123 (1986); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Access Denied: 
‘Tort Reform’ Rhetoric is Closing the Courthouse Door, 33 TRIAL 26 (1997).  See generally 
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link Between 
Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635 (2006) [he-
reinafter The Texas Two-Step] (discussing generally the possible link between damage caps 
in medical malpractice cases and access); Herbert  M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as 
Gatekeeper in the Civil Justice System, 81 JUDICATURE 22 (1997). 
 12. See Kuo-Chang Huang, How Legal Representation Affects Case Outcomes: An Em-
pirical Perspective from Taiwan, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 201-08 (2008) (reporting 
that both parties were represented in only 21% of over 100,000 cases formally litigated in 
Taiwan from 2000 to 2006); Bruce D. Sales, Connie J. Beck & Richard K. Haan, Is Self-
Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 594 (1993) (studying divorce cases in Maricopa County, Arizona in 
1990 and finding that “approximately 90% of the cases involved at least one litigant who 
self-represented, while in 52% of the cases both parties self-represented”).  The frequency 
of self-representation appears to be growing, as the number of persons unable to afford at-
torneys rises.  See, e.g., Margery A. Gibbs, More Americans Serving as Their Own Lawyers, 
YAHOO NEWS, Nov. 24, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20081124/ap_on_re_us/ 
representing_yourself. 
 13. The conventional wisdom is that only 2-3% of lawsuits are tried, and that in recent 
decades the trial rate has declined.  For statistics and possible explanations, see the articles 
collected in 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.  459 (2004). 
 14. See JAMES K. HAMMITT, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION, VOL. II: PAYMENTS 
BY AUTO INSURERS 37 (1985) (finding that represented claimants fared much better than un-
represented claimants in tort fault states after attorneys’ fees were deducted but that the dif-
ference was much smaller in no-fault states); Terry Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What 
They’re Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 221 
(1991) (finding that “by retaining legal counsel, the average New York workers’ compensa-
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tingency fees may have less of an impact on access than one might other-
wise expect.15  Conversely, if tort recoveries flow only or mostly to plain-
tiffs who either actually hire lawyers or can credibly threaten to do so, caps 
on contingency fees may make it difficult or impossible for many victims 
to obtain justice. 
We explore this issue by looking at patterns of representation among 
claimants who received payments for bodily injuries (“BI”) in Texas during 
1988-2005.  Our database includes every closed claim with a payout great-
er than or equal to $10,000 (nominal) from five commercial lines of insur-
ance.  Approximately 7% of successful BI claimants represented them-
selves.  Paid claims brought by persons who represented themselves had 
smaller payouts and were almost always resolved without litigation.  Self-
representation was roughly four times as common (12% versus 3.3%) in 
small claims (less than $10,000) as compared to large claims (greater than 
$25,000) (both amounts in 2008 dollars).  The filing of a lawsuit marked a 
fundamental divide: almost 16% of claims resolved without filing a lawsuit 
involved self-represented claimants, compared with a mere 0.2% of claims 
resolved after a lawsuit was filed. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes our data, Part III 
presents our results, Part IV discusses the implications of our findings, and 
Part V concludes.16 
I.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
We have published a series of articles on tort litigation17 using the Texas 
Closed Claim Database (“TCCD”), which is maintained by the Texas De-
 
tion claimant with a nonscheduled [permanent partial disability] may expect to receive al-
most $6,000 less in benefits than will the claimant who does not retain counsel”). 
 15. We use the label “self-represented claimants” rather than “pro se claimants” to avoid 
the association with lawsuits the phrase “pro se” entails.  As shown below, the overwhelm-
ing majority of payments recovered by self-represented claimants were obtained without 
filing a lawsuit. 
 16. Closed claim data collected by the Texas Department of Insurance can be down-
loaded free of charge. TEX. DEP’T OF INS. REPORTS LISTING, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/ 
reports/report4.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2009). 
 17. The articles include Bernard Black, David A. Hyman, Charles Silver & William M. 
Sage, Defense Costs and Insurer Reserves in Medical Malpractice and Other Personal In-
jury Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1988-2004, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 185 (2008); Bernard 
Black, Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Stability, Not Crisis: Medical 
Malpractice Claim Outcomes In Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2005) 
[hereinafter Stability, Not Crisis]; Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life is Cheap, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 1875 (2006); David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Kathryn Zeiler, Charles Sil-
ver & William M. Sage, Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award?: Post-Verdict Haircuts in 
Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3 (2007) [herei-
nafter Jury Verdicts]; Charles Silver, David A. Hyman & Bernard S. Black, The Impact of 
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partment of Insurance (“TDI”).  The TCCD, which we describe more fully 
in other works, contains individual reports of all Texas BI claims covered 
by five lines of commercial insurance (auto, general commercial, multi-
peril, medical professional liability, and other professional liability) that 
closed with payments exceeding $10,000 (nominal) from 1988 to 2005.18 
Because the TCCD uses a fixed nominal dollar reporting threshold, the 
dataset is subject to bracket creep.  Over time, the lower end of the bracket 
creeps downward, encompassing smaller and smaller claims.  Thus, a claim 
worth $10,000 (nominal) in 2005 would have been worth only $6,057 in 
1988.  More generally, a claim worth $10,000 in 2005 would have been 
worth less than $10,000 in any year prior to 2005, and thus would not have 
been reported to TDI.  Bracket creep has the potential to make time trends 
in the TCCD misleading. 
In other publications, we address the problem of bracket creep by adjust-
ing payments to 1988 dollars and excluding claims with real payments be-
low $10,000.19  This approach has an important drawback here.  Claims 
with real payments below $10,000 are common, and the frequency of self-
representation is higher in claims with smaller payouts.  Indeed, the highest 
rate of self-representation occurs in the bracket creep claims.  To preserve 
information about self-representation, we therefore include bracket creep 
claims in our summary tables.  When studying time trends, however, we 
adjust for bracket creep to avoid inflation-generated distortions. 
When submitting closed claim information to the TDI, insurers use 
“short forms” for claims with nominal payouts greater than $10,000 but 
less than $25,000, and “long forms” for claims with nominal payouts of 
$25,000 or more.20  Although both forms indicate whether the claimant 
 
the 2003 Texas Medical Malpractice Damages Cap on Physician Supply and Insurer 
Payouts: Separating Facts from Rhetoric, 44 TEXAS ADVOCATE 25 (2008) [hereinafter Se-
parating Facts from Rhetoric], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139190; Charles Sil-
ver, Kathryn Zeiler, Bernard S. Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Malpractice 
Payouts and Malpractice Insurance: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 33 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.: ISSUES & PRACTICE 177 (2008); Kathryn Zeiler, Charles 
Silver, Bernard S. Black, David A. Hyman & William M. Sage, Physicians’ Insurance Lim-
its and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 36 J. LE-
GAL STUD. s9 (2007) [hereinafter Physicians’ Insurance Limits]; Damage Caps, supra note 
1. 
 18. Unless otherwise indicated, all dollar amounts in this paper are in 1988 dollars, 
computed using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (annual average) as a 
price index. Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2009).  To 
convert to 2008 dollars, multiply by 1.82.  In regressions we define year as (year - 1988). 
 19. See supra note 17. 
 20. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., THE 2007 TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2009), available at http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/reports/pc/documents/taccar2007. 
pdf. 
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hired an attorney, long forms contain much more information than short 
forms.21  Many fields of potential interest—age, employment status, injury 
type, and injury cause—appear only on the long form,22 and neither form 
has all the information needed to fully study the choice between self-
representation and representation by counsel.23 
The TCCD contains only insured claims.24  Rates of self-representation 
may differ in uninsured cases, which lawyers are likely to find less appeal-
ing.  The TCCD also contains only claims covered by commercial or pro-
fessional lines of insurance.25  Cases involving personal lines of insurance, 
for example, personal auto, homeowners, or watercraft policies, may have a 
different pattern of self-representation as well.  Unfortunately, we lack a 
source of data with which to explore these issues. 
II.  RESULTS 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on all claims in the database.  
Commercial auto claims are the most common, the least likely to involve 
death as the injury alleged, and have the smallest mean and median 
payouts.  Medical malpractice claims are much less numerous than com-
mercial auto claims, but have the highest frequency of death, as well as the 
highest mean and median payouts. 
 
 21. Compare TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SHORT FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdata 
services/pc134ccrptshort.doc (last visited Dec. 20, 2009), with TEX. DEP’T OF INS., LONG 
FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdataservices/pc133ccrptlong.doc (last visited Dec. 
20, 2009). 
 22. Compare TEX. DEP’T OF INS., SHORT FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdata 
services/pc134ccrptshort.doc (last visited Dec. 20, 2009), with TEX. DEP’T OF INS., LONG 
FORM, http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/forms/pcdataservices/pc133ccrptlong.doc (last visited Dec. 
20, 2009). 
 23. A partial list of potentially relevant factors would include a variety of claim-related 
characteristics, such as injury severity, uninsured medical costs, lost wages, the potential for 
claim value to vary, and the obviousness of liability.  Claimants’ personal characteristics, 
such as their sex, education, nature of employment, claiming history, and experience with 
lawyers may also matter. The cost of legal services seems highly likely to influence the de-
cision to retain counsel as well.  The TCCD contains none of this information. See supra 
note 21. 
 24. See TEX. DEP’T OF INS., supra note 20. 
 25. The Texas Department of Insurance produces annual reports that describe the TCCD 
and provide a yearly snapshot of findings.  The annual reports can be downloaded free of 
charge.  See TEXAS DEP’T OF INSURANCE, supra note 20. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Claim Characteristics 
 Number of Claims 
% of All 
Claims 
% 
Death 
Mean 
Payout 
Median 
Payout 
Commercial 
Auto 99,047 56.5% 3.5% $61,595 $16,304 
General 
Commercial 33,322 19.0% 8.1% $146,409 $30,000 
Medical 
Professional 17,965 10.2% 29.1% $261,941 $96,154 
Multi-Peril 23,655 13.5% 6.5% $108,587 $26,125 
Other 
Professional 1,437 0.8% 23.4% $172,988 $38,820 
Total 175,426 100.0% 7.5% $105,471 $21,696 
Closed claims in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate 
reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment, by line of coverage, nature of injury 
alleged (death versus non-death), and mean and median payout (2008$).26  Includes “brack-
et creep” claims with payments below $10,000 (1988$). 
 
Table 2 provides further descriptive statistics on whether the plaintiff 
was represented by a lawyer and the resolution stage (pre-suit versus post-
suit) of each claim.  Table 2 indicates that across all lines of coverage 6.9% 
of claimants represented themselves, ranging from 2.5% (medical profes-
sional) to 7.9% (commercial auto).  In cases where no suit was filed, the 
rate of self-representation was far higher, ranging from 13.4% (commercial 
auto) to 24% (multi-peril).  In claims where a lawsuit was filed, however, 
the rate of self-representation was essentially zero across all lines of cover-
age.  For unrepresented claimants, there is an unbridgeable chasm between 
pre-suit and post-suit resolution.  The probability of suit varied widely, 
however, with commercial auto accounting for the lowest rate (42%) and 
medical professional having the highest (89.5%).27 
 
 
 
 
 26. See supra note 16. 
 27. The tendency of formal litigation to occur more often in medical malpractice cases 
than automobile cases has been observed before. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLIcy 56 (1985) (reporting that “[l]awsuits 
[were] filed in only 20 percent of automobile claims . . . whereas suits [were] filed in 58 
percent of malpractice cases . . . .”). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Self-Representation 
 % of Claimants Self-Represented  
 
 
All 
Claims 
Claims  
Resolved 
Pre-Suit 
Claims  
Resolved 
Post-Suit 
% of Claims 
Resolved  
Post-Suit 
Commercial 
Auto 7.9% 13.4% 0.3% 42.0% 
General 
Commercial 6.1% 23.6% 0.2% 74.8% 
Medical 
Professional 2.5% 21.6% 0.3% 89.5% 
Multi-Peril 7.7% 24.0% 0.3% 68.7% 
Other 
Professional 4.0% 18.6% 0.3% 79.4% 
Total 6.9% 15.8% 0.2% 57.0% 
Closed claims in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate 
reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment, by line of coverage, resolution litiga-
tion, and nature of representation (self vs. counsel).28  Includes “bracket creep” claims with 
payments below $10,000 (1988$). 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the relationship between self-
representation and payout.  As it shows, across all lines of coverage the 
frequency of self-representation declines steadily as the payout increases.  
Coverage line still matters, however.  Medical malpractice claimants re-
tained lawyers more often than auto claimants at all payment levels except 
the very smallest. 
 
 28. See supra note 16. 
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Table 3. Self-Representation by Coverage Type and Payout Level 
 Comm. Auto 
Gen. 
Comm. 
Multi-
Peril 
Medical 
Prof. 
Other 
Prof. 
All 
Lines 
Payout (2008$) % of Claimants Self-Represented 
<$10,000 11.4% 14.4% 15.2% 14.3% 8.8% 12.1% 
$10,000-$15,000 9.5% 10.7% 12.2% 8.6% 7.1% 10.0% 
$15,001-$20,000 8.7% 8.1% 10.4% 5.5% 8.5% 8.7% 
$20,001-$25,000 7.9% 7.6% 9.2% 5.8% 7.3% 7.9% 
$25,001-$50,000 5.7% 5.3% 6.6% 3.4% 2.4% 5.5% 
$50,001-$100,000 4.2% 2.6% 3.9% 1.9% 3.1% 3.4% 
>$100,000 2.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.5% 0.7% 1.2% 
All Paid Claims 7.9% 6.1% 7.7% 2.5% 4.0% 6.9% 
Percent of paid claims in which claimants represented themselves by line of coverage and 
payout (2008$), using the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding dup-
licate reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment.29  The first row is composed of 
“bracket creep” claims with payments below $10,000 (1988$). 
B. Multivariate Analysis 
1. Changes in the Rate of Self-Representation over Time 
We used multivariate analysis to study the factors that influence self-
representation and to determine whether the frequency of self-
representation changed over time.  Because the dependent variable, “law-
yer/no lawyer,” has only two possible values (1 when a claimant had coun-
sel; 0 otherwise), we used logit regressions.30  To avoid reporting time 
trends influenced by inflation, we excluded all “bracket creep” claims with 
real payments below $10,000 (1988$).  For independent variables, we used 
(year-1988) and a dummy for whether the claim was filed after Texas 
adopted tort reform in 1995.31  We report the results for each line of cover-
age and for the entire dataset.  The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
 29. See supra note 16. 
 30. We ran identical probit regressions as robustness checks.  In terms of the direction 
of effects and statistical significance, the results were identical. 
 31. For a description of the 1995 reforms, see Physicians’ Insurance Limits, supra note 
17, at s19-s20 and Martin Grace, Tort Reform: Are There Real Benefits? 8-11 (Aug. 2004) 
(unpublished paper, on file with Georgia State University Center for Risk Management and 
Insurance Research).  A more extensive package of lawsuit restrictions applies to cases filed 
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Table 4. Logit Regression Analysis of Self-Representation 
 
Comm. 
Auto 
Gen. 
Comm. 
Multi-
Peril 
Medical 
Prof. 
Other 
Prof. 
All 
Lines 
 Dependent Variable—Representation by Counsel 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Year 
.0397 .0755 .0669 .1952 .0121 .0695 
.0610 .1151 .1065 .2849 .1937 .0857 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 
Post-
Reform 
Dummy 
-.5205 -1.1060 -1.0072 -3.1996 -1.7635 -.7846 
-.3162 -.7074 -.6307 -2.2061 .0468 -.6256 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.000 
No. of 
claims 79,272 30,460 21,549 17,558 1,323 150,162 
Logistic regressions with robust standard errors of representation by counsel against year-
1988 and a tort reform dummy variable by line of insurance coverage for all claims with 
payouts greater than $10,000 (1988$) in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-
2005, excluding duplicate reports and one claim resolved at summary judgment.32 Coeffi-
cients are reported as 95% confidence intervals.  Year = year–1988.  Significant results are 
bolded. 
 
In Table 4, a confidence interval with only positive (negative) values in-
dicates a statistically significant higher (lower) probability of representa-
tion by counsel as the value of an independent variable increases.  Con-
versely, a confidence interval that spans zero indicates that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the probability of representa-
tion and the independent variable in question.  Thus, the 95% confidence 
interval of [.0397: .0610] shown in Table 4 for “Commercial Auto” claims 
implies a statistically significant increase in the rate of representation by 
counsel over time.  The positive spreads for all lines of coverage also mean 
the null hypothesis of no change over time can be rejected. 
 
after September 1, 2003.  When this paper was originally presented, the TCCD contained 
claims that had closed by 2005.  The vast majority of these claims were initiated before the 
effective date of the 2003 statute.  Accordingly, we do not attempt to study the impact of the 
2003 reforms in this paper. 
 32. See supra note 16. 
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Table 4 also indicates that the 1995 tort reform package slowed the trend 
toward increasing use of counsel.  The confidence intervals associated with 
the post-reform dummy are negative and significant for all lines except 
“Other Professional Liability.” 
2. Claim-level Factors 
We now turn to claim-level factors that might affect the rate of self-
representation.  Intuitively, the likelihood of self-representation should de-
cline as legal services become more valuable.  Three factors (claim size, 
claim complexity, and the cost/availability of legal services) are likely pre-
dictors of such circumstances.  We separately describe the logic for includ-
ing each factor, and then analyze their combined impact. 
a. Claim Size 
Claim size matters for two reasons.  First, insurers should become more 
reluctant to pay as the amount demanded from them grows.  As repeat 
players with appropriate knowledge and incentives, plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
well situated to provide the needed “encouragement.”  Second, plaintiffs’ 
risk aversion may increase with claim size.  If so, plaintiffs with larger 
claims should be more willing to spend money on legal services in order to 
reduce their risks.33 
The most obvious way to measure claim size is to use the payment a 
claimant received, as we do in Table 3.34  Unfortunately, the possibility of 
simultaneous (or reverse) causation makes payment a problematic indepen-
dent variable.  If attorneys in fact add value, their involvement increases 
the payments their clients receive.  Therefore, it may be true that more val-
uable claims are more likely to make their way to attorneys and that attor-
neys make claims more valuable than they otherwise would be. 
Accordingly, we use policy limits as a proxy for claim size.  The amount 
of the policy limit is set before a claim occurs.  Higher limits mean that 
higher damages are collectible, since there is limited ability to collect 
 
 33. Huang, supra note 12, at 205, also finds that the likelihood of retaining counsel rises 
with the amount in controversy.  Unfortunately, he does not explain how this amount was 
determined for the cases in his dataset.  Sales et al., supra note 12, at 561, found that parties 
with higher incomes retained lawyers more often in divorce cases, but they attributed this to 
greater ability to afford counsel rather than to higher stakes. 
 34. Death is a measure of injury severity, but we cannot use death as an independent 
variable because counsel appeared in all paid death claims. 
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above limits.35  Policy size thus affects claim value without being tainted 
by reverse causation.36 
Because the TCCD contains policy limits only for the primary insurer, 
we must exclude all multi-payer cases from regressions in which policy 
limits are employed as an independent variable.  Multi-payer cases are 
those in which excess carriers or other sources contribute to settlements.  
Excluding these cases reduces the size of the dataset by 20,356 claims.  As 
in Table 4, we also exclude cases with real payments below $10,000 
(1988$) from all regressions to avoid bracket creep. 
b. Claim Complexity 
As claims become more complex, specialized legal and factual know-
ledge becomes more important for plaintiffs.37  For example, when liabili-
ty, causation, and damages are obvious (such as in most rear-end automo-
bile collisions), self-representation is more practicable than when one or 
more elements are difficult to gauge and likely to be disputed (as is usually 
the case in medical malpractice cases).  When claims are complex, simply 
knowing how to develop and package them for consideration by insurance 
carriers is valuable.  Thus, it is easier for legal services to “add value” to 
complex cases than to simple ones. 
We use line of coverage as a (highly imperfect) proxy for claim com-
plexity.38  Although the TCCD contains other indirect measures of claim 
 
 35. See Jury Verdicts, supra note 17, at 35; Separating Facts from Rhetoric, supra note 
17, at 180-84;  Physicians’ Insurance Limits, supra note 17, at s8.  Medical malpractice 
claimants recovered more than the policy limits only about 2% of the time.  Defendants pay 
only about 44% of the total amount awarded by juries—and they pay only about 10% of the 
amount awarded above-limits, most of which is paid by insurers.  DANZON, supra note 27, at 
56, also found “that awards tend to rise with the limits of the defendant’s insurance cover-
age.”  Danzon studied settlements separately from jury verdicts. 
 36. Higher limits may also indicate practice areas with special potential to inflict serious 
injuries, such as surgery, obstetrics, or anesthesiology.  Providers more likely to generate 
high-dollar claims may purchase larger policies than others, both to protect their personal 
assets and to satisfy minimum coverage requirements set by hospitals.  Whether this is true, 
however, is uncertain.  Our studies of malpractice claims found that doctors with paid peri-
natal claims carried smaller policies than others, even though payments on perinatal claims 
were above average.  The correlation between policy size and exposure is therefore imper-
fect, at best. 
 37. See Sales et al., supra note 12, at 567 (finding that 39% of parties who hired lawyers 
identified complexity as a reason for their doing so).  On the basis of telephone interviews 
with 273 parties to divorce lawsuits in Maricopa County, Arizona in 1991, Sales et al. also 
concluded that case complexity, measured by the presence or absence of children in a mar-
riage and the ownership of real estate, affected the decision to hire counsel. Id. at 564-65. 
 38. Huang, supra note 12, at 206-07, also finds variation in self-representation rates by 
subject matter of litigation. 
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complexity, such as the duration from injury to payment, the number of de-
fendants, and the commencement of formal litigation,39 the possibility of 
simultaneous (or reverse) causation complicates the use of these variables 
in regressions.  For example, although we expect more complex claims to 
take longer than simpler ones, attorney involvement may increase (or de-
crease) claim duration.  Even when claims are of similar complexity, attor-
neys may make fuller investigations or drag out negotiations longer than 
self-represented claimants.  Similarly, the number of defendants may moti-
vate the plaintiff to hire a lawyer—but it is also possible that the lawyer 
identified additional potential responsible parties—making claims handled 
by lawyers seem more complex than would otherwise be the case.  The fil-
ing of a formal complaint may also be more likely in relatively complex 
cases, but the involvement of an attorney is effectively a precondition to the 
filing of a lawsuit, as shown in Table 2.  Accordingly, we rely on line of 
coverage as a proxy for complexity, with the expectation that commercial 
auto claims will be simpler than other types of lawsuits. 
c. Cost of Legal Services 
Finally, the cost and availability of legal services should matter as well.  
Other things being equal, more availability and lower cost should imply 
higher utilization—particularly if more availability and lower costs encour-
age the development of a “culture of claiming.”40  In Texas, as in other 
states, lawyers concentrate in urban areas.  Claimants residing in urban 
counties may therefore be more likely to use lawyers than rural Texans.41  
To test this hypothesis, we created an urban/rural county dummy variable 
using the membership list of the Texas Conference of Urban Counties.  The 
 
 39. See supra note 21. 
 40. Claiming rates vary considerably both across states and within them. See, e.g., INS. 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN AUTO INJURY CLAIMS, PART ONE: ANALYSIS OF CLAIM FRE-
QUENCY 11 (2d ed. 1995) (reporting a national average of twenty-nine bodily injury (“BI”) 
claims per 100 property damage (“PD”) claims for tort (i.e., fault) states in 1993, ranging 
from a high of sixty-one BI claims per 100 PD claims in California to a low of eighteen in 
Wyoming); id. at 3 (“Central city territories usually have more bodily injury claims per 100 
property damage claims than territories composed of suburbs, medium-sized cities, small 
towns, or rural areas.”).  Even across urban areas, however, substantial variation can occur. 
See id. (reporting ninety-nine BI claims per 100 PD claims in Los Angeles but only forty in 
San Diego).  See also Kevin D. Hart & Philip G. Peters, Cultures of Claiming: Local Varia-
tion in Malpractice Claim Frequency, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 77 (2008). 
 41. Stated differently, rural residents may be more likely to “lump it.” See, e.g., VASAN-
THAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS 118-19 (2001) 
(finding that patients in urban areas are more likely to sue dentists, but finding a negative 
association between trial lawyers per capita and the frequency of dental malpractice claims). 
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variable takes a value of one for the thirty-five counties that are members 
and a value of zero for the 219 counties that are not.42 
d. Regression Analysis 
Table 5 presents logit regressions by coverage line using these indepen-
dent variables.  It also presents an aggregate regression on the entire dataset 
in which “Commercial Auto” is the omitted line of coverage. 
 
 42. See Texas Conference of Urban Counties—FAQ, http://www.cuc.org/faq.aspx 
#members (last visited Dec. 17, 2009) (listing the thirty-five counties that are members of 
the Texas Conference of Urban Counties). 
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Table 5. Multivariate Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Representation 
by Counsel by Coverage Line and for All Lines 
 Comm. Auto 
Gen. 
Comm. 
Multi-
Peril 
Medical 
Prof. 
Other 
Prof. 
All 
Lines 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Year .0401: .0617 
.0692: 
.1097 
.0639: 
.1044 
.1772: 
.2681 
.0293: 
.2209 
.0637: 
.0805 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 
Post-Reform 
Dummy 
-.5128: 
-.3066 
-.9726: 
-.5638 
-.9714: 
-.5869 
-2.8125: 
-1.8247 
-1.978: 
-.1473 
-.7095: 
-.5467 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 .000 
Ln(Policy 
Limit (1988$)) 
.1065: 
.1557 
.0583: 
.1814 
-.1831: 
.0174 
-.645: 
-.4569 
-.323: 
.426 
.0558: 
.1018 
P>|z| 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.787 0.000 
Urban .2314: .3557 
.0505: 
.2854 
.1343: 
.3872 
-.4728: 
.0883 
-.9429: 
.4081 
.1928: 
.2912 
P>|z| 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.179 0.438 0.000 
Gen. Comm.      
.0064: 
.1261 
P>|z|      .030 
Multi-Peril      
-.25: 
-.1282 
P>|z|      .000 
Medical Prof.      
.7969: 
1.013 
P>|z|      .000 
Other Prof.      
.1803: 
.7751 
P>|z|      .002 
Constant .0708: .7263 
-.2948: 
1.3767 
1.6297: 
4.3143 
9.0604: 
11.7076
-3.355: 
7.3869 
.739: 
1.3503 
P>|z| .017 .205 .000 .000 .462 .000 
No. of claims 75,112 23,837 17,454 12,349 1,048 129,800 
Logistic regressions with robust standard errors of representation by counsel by line of in-
surance coverage for all single-payer claims with payouts greater than $10,000 (1988$) in 
the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate reports and one 
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claim resolved at summary judgment.43 Coefficients are reported as 95% confidence inter-
vals.  Year = Year–1988.  Statistically significant results are bolded.  Commercial Auto is 
the omitted coverage line in the All Lines regression. 
 
As in Table 4, across all lines of coverage we find a consistent time-
trend toward increased use of counsel and a negative impact from the 1995 
tort reforms.  Larger exposure (proxied by ln(policy limits)) is associated 
with an increased use of counsel in two coverage lines (commercial auto 
and general commercial), but with decreased use of counsel in medical 
malpractice.  Claimants in urban areas are more likely to use counsel in 
three coverage lines—commercial auto, general commercial, and multi-
peril.  Regression [6] indicates that, relative to commercial auto, the proba-
bility of employing counsel was higher in general liability, medical profes-
sional, and other professional coverage, but lower in multi-peril. 
The results in regression [4] for medical professional liability are counte-
rintuitive, since the Urban dummy is insignificant and larger policy limits 
predict a lower likelihood of representation by counsel.  The unimportance 
of location has a plausible explanation.  Medical malpractice injuries tend 
to be unusually severe.  These cases have by far the highest mean and me-
dian payments, and in almost 30% of the cases the patients died.  The size 
of malpractice claims may justify the cost of searching for a lawyer, regard-
less of where one resides. 
The negative impact of policy limits in regression [4] is harder to under-
stand.  Why might higher policy limits make it less attractive to retain 
counsel?  Insurers’ settlement behavior may explain this result.  Insurers 
know how much coverage providers carry.  Insurance policies also require 
providers to give insurers prompt notice of mishaps likely to cause liability 
claims.  Taking advantage of this information, insurers may identify claims 
with significant potential to generate large losses and seek to settle them 
before plaintiffs’ counsel becomes involved.  The presence of counsel on 
the claimant’s side drives up insurers’ costs by increasing both payouts and 
litigation expenses.44  It therefore makes sense for insurers to intervene ag-
gressively in cases with clear liability and large policy limits, where the po-
tential savings are the greatest. 
 
 43. See supra note 16. 
 44. This has been known for years. See HAMMITT, supra note 14, at 34-36 (studying 
closed automobile claims collected in 1977 and finding that “[r]epresented claimants not 
only recover[ed] larger payments on average, they [were] also significantly more likely to 
recover some payment for general damages than [were] unrepresented claimants with com-
parable injuries”); see also id. at 64 (finding that the “average time to settlement [of BI 
claims] more than double[d] when claimants hired attorneys”). 
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Table 6 provides some suggestive evidence supporting this hypothesis.  
It shows that mean and median real policy limits for self-representing med-
ical malpractice claimants are nearly double those of claimants armed with 
attorneys.  By contrast, the median real policy limit post-suit is nearly the 
same for both types of claimants. 
 
Table 6. Policy Limits for Medical Professional Liability Claims Resolved 
Pre- and Post-Suit 
 Claims Settled Pre-Suit Claims Settled Post-Suit 
 
Self-
Representing 
Claimants 
Claimants 
with  
Counsel 
Self-
Representing 
Claimants 
Claimants 
with 
Counsel 
Mean  
Policy Limit 
(1988$) 
$2,016,074 $1,179,335 $2,151,065 $906,811 
Median  
Policy Limit 
(1988$) 
$1,211,387 $657,462 $672,138 $605,693 
No. of 
claims 387 1283 36 11,043 
Mean and median policy limits (1988$) for self-representing claimants and claims with 
counsel by resolution stage, using claims covered by Medical Professional Liability policies 
in the “All Lines Full Variables” dataset for 1988-2005, excluding duplicate reports and one 
claim resolved at summary judgment.45  Includes “bracket creep” claims with payments be-
low $10,000 (1988$). 
III.  DISCUSSION 
A. Implications of Our Findings 
Although 7% of paid BI claimants were self-represented, virtually every 
paid claimant who filed suit had legal counsel.46  The conventional view is 
that settlement occurs in the shadow of the expected outcome at trial.47  As-
suming that is correct, it follows that only BI claimants with lawyer-worthy 
claims can obtain settlement payments.  Stated differently, self-
 
 45. See supra note 16. 
 46. See supra note 16.  Because the TCCD includes only paid claims, we do not capture 
the representation patterns of those who engaged in litigation but did not receive a payout. 
 47. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 969-70 (1979). 
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representation only works for claimants who could hire attorneys if they 
wanted to—since only these claimants can threaten insurers with the risk of 
losing at trial.  Claimants with non-lawyer-worthy claims will not receive 
anything, because they cannot credibly threaten to extract a forced payment 
in an amount set by a court.48  Unless insurers willingly throw money at 
claims on which they face no exposure at trial—a doubtful proposition—
the only plausible inference is that they thought the unrepresented clai-
mants they paid would have been able to hire lawyers, had they tried.  As 
Alfred F. Conard observed in the 1950s, a claimant’s ability to hire a law-
yer and sue “is the threat that makes defendants settle.”49 
The obvious conclusion is that a cap on contingency fees, if set below 
the market-clearing price for legal services, will result in many claimants 
being left without any recourse against those who caused their injuries.  
This conclusion provides a simple incentive-based explanation for the sup-
port for caps shown by tort-reform advocates: capping attorneys’ fees helps 
defendants, not plaintiffs. 
One additional note: quality of lawyering matters as well.  We have fo-
cused on a binary set of options: lawyer or no-lawyer.  But, if price caps 
reduce the quality of lawyering, both sides are likely to take the case less 
seriously (and its value is likely to be reduced) relative to what would hap-
pen in a world without such caps.  For example, in cases involving social 
security benefits, the government initially takes a position that is not “sub-
stantially justified” (which results in a fee award under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act) 42% of the time; in veterans’ benefits cases, the government’s 
position is not substantially justified 70% of the time.50  Does anyone be-
lieve it is a coincidence that error rates are high when fees are capped? 
B. Time Trends 
After controlling for the tort reforms enacted in 1995, we find a consis-
tent decline in self-representation across all five lines of coverage.  Similar 
results have been reported in earlier research.51  What might explain these 
 
 48. Cf. Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321 (1993) (“Her suit sought damages, and if it 
had merit she might be able to retain a tort lawyer to handle it on a contingent basis. . . . If 
the plaintiff were unable to secure a lawyer in the private market, this might mean the suit 
had no merit, although alternatively it might mean that the plaintiff lacked the necessary in-
formation to obtain a suitable lawyer.”). 
 49. Alfred F. Conard, The Impact of Expense on Injury Claims, 287 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 114 (May 1953). 
 50. Posting of Marcia Coyle to The BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/02/roberts-startled-by-government-errors-in-vet-
cases.html (Feb. 23, 2010, 12:13 EST). 
 51. See INS. RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 1. 
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patterns?  The cost of self-representation may have increased or the cost of 
legal services may have declined.  Rising real wages could account for the 
former.  The latter could be explained by growth in the supply of lawyers 
or the rise of law firms that specialize in small claims, often referred to de-
risively as “settlement mills.”52  Alternatively, insurers in Texas may have 
grown increasingly reluctant to pay unrepresented claimants—and clai-
mants responded by hiring lawyers.  Unfortunately, we are unable to dis-
tinguish between these possible explanations with the information available 
in the TCCD. 
C. Effect of 1995 Tort Reforms 
The probability of self-representation increased following the tort re-
forms adopted by Texas in 1995.  The most obvious explanation for this is 
that more claimants had to represent themselves because the supply of legal 
services contracted.  In other words, tort reforms made legal services less 
available, making self-representation more attractive. 
The problem with this argument is that claimants who cannot secure re-
presentation cannot extract settlement payments from insurers because they 
cannot credibly threaten to sue.  Self-representation is a viable option only 
for claimants who could “lawyer up” if it became necessary.53  If tort re-
forms make legal services more expensive/less available, claimants who 
could pay the higher prices but do not wish to may find self-representation 
attractive, but claimants who are priced out of the market must simply give 
up.  Claimants who lost access to lawyers as a result of 1995 legislation 
should not turn up as successful self-representing claimants in the TCCD; 
they should become unsuccessful claimants and drop out of the dataset en-
tirely. 
Another possibility is that the 1995 tort reforms reduced the need for le-
gal services by making it easier to evaluate the merits of claims.  Some 
claimants presumably start out by representing themselves and consult a 
lawyer only after a malpractice insurer rejects their demands or offers them 
less than they want.  In some of these instances, plaintiffs’ attorneys decide 
that the insurer wrongly failed to pay or offered too little, and sign up the 
clients.  In a fraction of these cases, the insurer pays the claim after counsel 
is retained and the claim appears in the TCCD as one with a represented 
claimant. 
 
 52. For a description of plaintiffs’ law firms that specialize in processing small claims 
cheaply, see generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1485, 1487 (2009). 
 53. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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If tort reforms make claim values easier to detect and harder to manipu-
late, insurers should generate false negatives less often and plaintiffs’ attor-
neys should agree with insurers more often.  In other words, plaintiffs’ at-
torneys should more often reject claimants who were dissatisfied with the 
treatment they received from insurers.  The rejected claimants should then 
either take whatever non-zero offer they received (and be identified as self-
represented in the TCCD) or drop their claims (and fall out of the TCCD).  
In either event, the frequency of successful self-represented claimants 
should rise relative to that of represented claimants. 
This explanation is consistent with a study by Professor Martin Grace, 
who found that post-1995 claimants received a higher fraction of the com-
pensation they demanded in settlement of their claims (44% pre-reform 
versus 49% post-reform).54  Grace hypothesized that higher percentage re-
coveries occurred because the 1995 reforms made it more difficult for 
claimants to manipulate their damages.55  In other words, the reforms 
enabled insurance carriers to have greater confidence in claimants’ asser-
tions because fraudulent and inflated demands were easier to spot. 
D. The Proof is in the Pudding 
Apart from the claims reported to the TCCD, is there any other evidence 
that tort reform can interrupt a trend toward greater use of private counsel?  
In a series of articles, Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin explored the im-
pact of the 1995 and 2003 Texas tort reforms on plaintiffs’ lawyers’ wil-
lingness to take cases.56  They report that many plaintiffs’ attorneys cut 
back, especially in the area of medical malpractice.57  Their finding sug-
gests that the cost of private counsel increased, causing the balance to shift 
in favor of self-representation for some claimants. 
E. Experience in Other States 
Studies conducted in other states also find that unrepresented claimants 
generally cannot sue successfully.  A 1993 American Bar Foundation 
(“ABF”) study used a Wisconsin dataset of closed medical malpractice 
claims.  It found that self-representation was no substitute for representa-
tion by an attorney.  Of the 2,896 closed claims in the study, 59 involved 
 
 54. See Grace, supra note 31, at 22. 
 55. Id. at 25. 
 56. See The Texas Two-Step, supra note 11. 
 57. Survival of the Fittest, supra note 11, at 317-19. 
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pro se plaintiffs and another 102 involved unrepresented plaintiffs.58  
“Claimants were able to secure a monetary settlement in only 1 of the 59 
pro se claims [a success rate of 1.7%], and 8 of the other 102 claims [a suc-
cess rate of 7.8%].”59  In contrast, the success rate for all claimants 
represented by counsel was 33.4%60 and the success rate for claimants 
represented by the two most experienced plaintiffs’ firms in the study was 
50.2%.61  Older studies also found that unrepresented claimants obtained 
payments less often than claimants armed with attorneys.62  Thus, represen-
tation makes a difference and the best representation can make a substantial 
difference. 
Unlike the TCCD, the Wisconsin dataset included claims that closed 
without payments.63  Lumping pro se litigants and unrepresented litigants 
together, the ABF report indicates that claimants without attorneys went 
home empty-handed 94.4% of the time (152/161 = 94.4%).64 
The Wisconsin data came from a single state-backed medical malprac-
tice insurer, the Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan 
(“WHCLIP”).65  The dataset also contained only 6,727 closed claims, more 
than half of which were incident reports in which “no legal claim was filed 
and . . . the patient did not assert a claim for money.”66  The analysis fo-
cused on 2,896 claims in which formal legal proceedings were commenced. 
By contrast, the TCCD contains over 182,000 reports of paid claims 
filed by all admitted carriers operating in the Texas market.  It therefore 
provides a more comprehensive picture of claiming behavior than the Wis-
consin dataset.  The TCCD reports also cover all commercial coverage 
lines, not just medical malpractice.  Finally, the reports in the TCCD cover 
 
 58. Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and Strategic Ad-
vantage in Medical Malpractice Claims 6 (Am. B. Found. Working Paper No. 9210, 1993) 
(Pro se claimants were formally listed as such in the claim file.  For unrepresented clai-
mants, the claim file simply did not identify the claimants’ attorney.). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. See id. at 20. 
 62. Marc A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin & Irving Mark, Accidents, Money, and the 
Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 
(1961) (study of personal injury cases finding success rates of 90% and 65% for represented 
and unrepresented claimants, respectively).  See Clarence Morris & James C. N. Paul, The 
Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 924 (1962) (reporting 
that 95% (111 of 117) of represented claimants with non-fatal injuries stemming from au-
tomobile accidents obtained some recovery, and that only 66% (129 of 194) of unrepre-
sented claimants did). 
 63. Daniels et al., supra note 58, at 16. 
 64. Id. at 6. 
 65. Id. at 13. 
 66. Id. at 16. 
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all claims on which insurers paid more than $10,000 (nominal), including 
claims insurers settled without formal litigation.  The TCCD thus enables 
one to examine an area of claiming behavior—pre-suit resolution—in 
which self-representation may be especially common. 
Comparing Wisconsin and Texas, one difference jumps out.  The ABF 
study does not analyze or present results for the pre-lawsuit period, which, 
in Texas, was the most common way for unrepresented BI claimants to ob-
tain recoveries.  Across all lines of insurance, about 7% of the reports in the 
TCCD concerned unrepresented BI claimants who recovered payments 
without filing lawsuits.  The percentage for the medical malpractice cover-
age line was relatively low, but still positive.  Judging from the ABF report, 
the analogous recovery rate for medical malpractice claimants in Wisconsin 
appears to be zero. 
We originally suspected that the manner of reporting data accounted for 
the difference between the ABF report’s findings and our own.  In fact, the 
findings appear to reflect a real difference in the way claims were handled.  
According to Stephen Daniels, “WHCLIP didn’t really pay much attention 
to something in terms [of] setting aside reserves or entertaining any settle-
ment discussions until the other side went through the trouble of filing a 
formal legal complaint.”67  Texas insurers, including those that sell medical 
malpractice coverage, do not require such a show of force.  Were they to do 
so,  the data strongly suggest that for claims of all types the rate of success-
ful self-representation would drop to near zero—that is, to the Wisconsin 
rate.  It is all but impossible for medical malpractice claimants to sue suc-
cessfully without help from attorneys. 
As a claims handling strategy, there is something to be said for the poli-
cy of waiting for claimants to sue.68  Some claims are meritorious; some 
are not.  It can be hard to distinguish the former from the latter, especially 
when claims are complex.  Rather than bear the cost of sorting all claims, 
including those that gave rise only to incident reports or were brought to 
their attention by unrepresented claimants, WHCLIP used plaintiffs’ attor-
neys to do some initial sorting for it.  It used a contingent fee lawyer’s wil-
 
 67. E-mail from Stephen Daniels to Charles Silver (Nov. 11, 2008, 14:10:00 CST) (on 
file with author). 
 68. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort 
Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1122 (2006) (“Nothing prevents 
providers or liability carriers from offering payments before patients sue or from paying va-
lid claims expeditiously.  Yet, they rarely compensate patients until threatened with litiga-
tion . . . . [B]y and large, compensation flows only to patients who sue and only after litiga-
tion becomes protracted.  On economic grounds this is easy to explain.  Given the high 
degree of under-claiming and the high drop rates for malpractice cases, the strategy of pay-
ing claims only after protracted litigation minimizes expected liability costs.”). 
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lingness to handle a claim as a signal that the claim was worth a closer 
look.  WHCLIP ignored other claims because unrepresented claimants 
could not credibly threaten to sue. 
Texas insurers relied on plaintiffs’ attorneys less heavily than WHCLIP, 
but the difference should not be exaggerated.  In Texas, only 450 of 17,515 
paid medical malpractice claims (2.5%) involved self-represented clai-
mants.  Texas medical malpractice insurers therefore had the benefit of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ sorting efforts in the vast majority of paid claims.  We 
find a similar pattern across all lines of coverage and payout.  As Table 3 
reflects, the highest rate of self-representation is found in multi-peril cases 
with a payout of less than $10,000—but even here, only 15% of plaintiffs 
proceed without a lawyer.  Lawyers’ willingness to handle small claims 
supports the inference that unrepresented claimants succeed only because 
they could “lawyer up” if necessary. 
F. Wealth and Income and the Decision to Hire Counsel 
Disagreement exists over whether or how greatly parties’ wealth and in-
come affect the decision to employ counsel to address legal problems.69  
Because the TCCD contains no measure of claimants’ wealth or income, 
we cannot assess this factor’s importance.  Based on other research and 
discussions with plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas, however, we believe that es-
sentially all claimants who hire lawyers in BI suits in Texas use contingent 
percentage fee arrangements. Because these arrangements free claimants 
from the obligation of paying for legal services except from their recove-
ries, we would not expect wealth or income to directly influence the deci-
sion to hire lawyers. 
To be sure, income might indirectly affect lawyers’ willingness to take 
cases.  All other things equal, claimants with higher incomes will have 
higher lost earnings.  If the lawyer’s fee is a fixed percentage of the recov-
ery, higher lost earnings will translate into a higher fee.  In addition, many 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will only accept a case if there is a minimum amount of 
damages—and claimants with higher incomes will more easily satisfy this 
 
 69. Compare AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG LOW-INCOME AND MODERATE-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS 
STUDY (1994) (finding that wealth matters) and Bruce D. Sales, Connie J. Beck & Richard 
K. Haan, Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney Representation in Di-
vorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 594-98 (1993) (also finding that wealth matters) 
with Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer, Is that the Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 875 (2008) (finding similar lawyer retention patterns across wealth levels). 
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requirement.70  In combination, these factors make high-income claimants 
more appealing than low-income claimants. 
G. Limitations of Our Study 
We do not offer a formal model of the decision to hire or not hire a law-
yer.  Without a model, considerable caution is required in interpreting the 
patterns we document.  For example, the time trends we observe are only 
meaningful if, inter alia, the claiming environment is otherwise stable.  If 
the environment changed in ways affecting the cost and value of legal ser-
vices, claimants’ propensity to hire lawyers may have changed as well.  Al-
though we have controlled for the factors we were able to identify, our 
findings are tentative.  Further research will be necessary to fully under-
stand the dynamics at stake. 
CONCLUSION 
Over an extended period, and across multiple lines of coverage, an 
overwhelming majority of successful bodily injury claimants in Texas de-
cided they needed a lawyer.  When claims can be resolved without the init-
iation of formal litigation, a small percentage of claimants decide to 
represent themselves.  The option of self-representation exists for these 
claimants because they have lawyer-worthy claims.  In other words, these 
claimants can credibly threaten to “lawyer up” unless paid amounts they 
consider satisfactory. 
Tort reforms can cause the supply of legal services to contract by cap-
ping fees, reducing claim values, or making litigation riskier or more ex-
pensive for claimants.  All these changes alter the costs and benefits of le-
gal representation, and thus affect the decision to hire counsel or do 
without.  When the scarcity of legal services increases, some claimants who 
could hire lawyers find it economically better to represent themselves, but 
many others are priced out of the market entirely.  For these claimants, the 
only option is to abandon their claims.  Only claimants who can credibly 
threaten to litigate successfully can extract settlement payments, and clai-
mants who cannot find lawyers cannot make this threat. 
 
 70. Hyman & Silver, supra note 68, at 1117-20 (describing efforts by plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to screen cases with routine rejection of cases with insufficient damages). 
